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Utah Court of Appeals 
Attn: Lisa Collins, Clerk 
450 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Ivers et al v. UDOT 
Utah Court of Appeals Case No. 2005024 6-CA 
Dear Ms. Collins: 
We represent appellants in the above-referenced matter that was argued before the court of 
appeals on Wednesday, October 26, 2005. Pursuant to Rule 24(i), UTAH R. APP. P., appellants 
hereby supplement their briefs with the following legal authorities bearing upon issues involved 
in this appeal. 
• Point 1 of appellants' opening brief (at p. 7), quotes the just compensation clause under 
Utah's Constitution. The following cases hold that Utah's Constitution is broader than 
the similar provision under the federal constitution: 
Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Utah 1995) (Article I, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution is broader in its language than the similar provision in the Fifth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution). 
Strawberry Electric Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1996) ("[A]rticle 
I, Section 22 protects all property protected by its federal counterpart, and perhaps even more so 
due to its more expansive language.") (citation omitted). 
• The appellate court should disregard arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See, 
e.g., Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. OfEduc, 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990). The State of 
Utah made an argument regarding the definition of limited access highway for the first 
time at oral argument on October 26, 2005. 
• UTAH CODE ANN. §72-6-117(5) provides: 
A highway authority may acquire, by gift, devise, purchase, or 
condemnation, private or public property and property rights for a 
Member, International Society of Pnmerus I aw Firms • Rp«:t'<: nnw-tnrv nf Bprnmitim^ T«C. 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Lisa Collins, Clerk 
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October 27, 2005 
limited-access facility and service road, including rights of access, 
air, view, and light. . . . (Emphasis added). 
Thank you for your kind attention to this matter. 
Very truly your^ 
JQHN W.HOLT 
cc:\Stephen C. Ward 
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INTRODUCTION 
Appellee (referred to herein as "UDOT") condemned a portion of appellants' 
(referred to herein collectively as "Arby's") commercial property. That property was then 
contributed to UDOT's adjacent construction project, severely diminishing the value of 
Arby's remaining property. Arby's is entitled, under constitutional principles and the 
express provisions of Utah's condemnation statutes, to put on evidence at trial of 
severance damages resulting from UDOT's condemnation. 
Arby's submits State of Utah v. Harvey Real Estate, 57 P.3d 1088 (Utah 2002) 
does not mandate the exclusion of severance damages in this case. The distinctions 
between the present matter and Harvey Real Estate should be carefully analyzed, rather 
than given short shrift. Based upon the analysis of the particular facts and circumstances 
in this matter, this court should reverse the lower court's ruling and permit the finder of 
fact to consider evidence on the issue of lost accessibility. 
Additionally, with respect to the issue of Arby's loss of view and visibility, UDOT 
has failed to adequately explain how the holdings of Harvey Real Estate or Utah State 
Road Comm'n. v. Miya, 526 P.2d 962 (Utah 1974) preclude Arby's claims for severance 
damages resulting from UDOT's taking of the appurtenant rights of light and air. 
Specifically, Harvey Real Estate serves as no precedential value on the issue of loss of 
view and visibility and does not defeat Arby's claims under the Miya decision. Arby's 
should be permitted to present the issue of loss of view and visibility to the trier of fact. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
UDOT's brief does not dispute or oppose any of the factual statements set forth in 
Arby's opening brief. 
Arby's responds to the following numbered paragraphs of the statement of facts 
contained in UDOT's brief as follows: 
1. Arby's is located on the northwest corner 
of what was the intersection of Shepard 
Lane and US 89 in Farmington, Utah. 
2. The size of the Arby's commercial site is 
approximately 0.416 acres. 
3. UDOT condemned a 0.048 acre portion 
of Arby's property in fee. 
4. The 0.048 acres of Arby's condemned 
property was used to construct a one-way 
frontage road immediately parallel to the 
newly elevated and widened US 89. 
None of the land taken from Arby's was 
used to widen US 89. 
5. The Shepard Lane/US 89 intersection 
has been eliminated and US 89 has been 
[ elevated creating an underpass allowing 
traffic to travel east-west on Shepard 
Lane underneath the elevated highway. 
Not in dispute. 
Not in dispute. 
Not in dispute. 
Arby's does not dispute its property 
was taken to construct a one-way 1 
frontage road as part of UDOT's 
project. However, Arby's does 
dispute that its property was not 
taken for purposes of widening US 
89. In fact, the Condemnation 
Resolution specifically states the | 
purpose of the taking was for the 
widening of US 89. Condemnation 
Resolution, R. at p. 6. 
Not in dispute. 
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6. As a result of the project, access to 
Arby's from US 89 can now be had from 
access points approximately one-half 
mile to the north and one-half mile to the 
south of Arby's to the new frontage 
roads constructed for the project. 
7. Access to Arby's from Shepard Lane 
remains unchanged. 
8. The purpose of eliminating the Shepard 
Lane/US 89 intersection and thus 
elevating and widening US 89 was to 
decrease the number of accidents in the 
area due to the nature of the intersection. 
9. It should be noted that there are two 
other cases where properties adjacent to 
Arby's and across US 89 from Arby's 
have been denied the same relief in their 
respective trial courts that Arby's is 
seeking in this case. Moreover, there is 
an appellate court case where the rulings 
in Harvey were upheld last year. 
Arby's admits its property can be 
accessed. However, there has been 
no evidence presented or considered 
by a trier of fact concerning how 
access has been impacted. UDOT 
makes conclusory statements that 
access to the property remains 
reasonable and the value of the 
property has not been diminished. 
Prior to the condemnation of Arby's 
property and the construction of 
UDOT's massive project, Arby's 
restaurant was purposely positioned 
on the corner of a busy intersection. 
The easy access and visibility are 
what gave Arby's property its value 
as commercial property. 
Arby's admits there is access to its 
property from Shepard Lane. Arby's 
also incorporates herein by this 
reference its response to the 
foregoing paragraph 6. 
The Condemnation Resolution 
specifically provides Arby's property 
was taken to widen the expressway. 
However, even if the subject 
intersection was eliminated for 
safety reasons, this does not excuse | 
UDOT from paying severance 
damages to Arby's. 
Arby's objects to this fact statement 
and its relevance. One of the other 
pending cases cited by Arby's 
pertains to the Goodyear Tire 
property located immediately north j 
of the Arby's property. See 
Addendum UB" to UDOT's brief. 
The Goodyear case has essentially 
been treated as a companion case to 
the present matter because it is 
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adjacent to the Arby's property; the 
issues are substantially similar; and 
the two cases involve the same 
counsel and the same judge. In fact, 
the Goodyear case has essentially 
been put on hold pending the 
outcome of the present appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
UDOT FAILS TO APPRECIATE THE SIGNIFICANCE 
OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PRESENT 
MATTER AND HARVEY REAL ESTATE 
Although Arby's has pointed out numerous distinguishing features of the present 
case as compared to Harvey Real Estate, UDOT focuses upon the commercial vs. non-
commercial distinction. UDOT claims this distinction has no bearing on the analysis of 
whether Arby's can pursue severance damages. UDOT has utterly ignored the case 
Arby's has cited from another jurisdiction holding that the commercial characteristic of 
property is a legitimate factor in the severance damages analysis. See People v. Becker, 
69 Cal. Rptr. 110, 114 (4th Dist. 1968) ("The fact that property abutting on a street is 
zoned for business purposes and is located in a busy commercial area enters into a 
determination whether impairment of the right of access is substantial."). UDOT has 
failed to present any authority that is contrary to this position. The commercial nature and 
location of Arby's property and all of the other distinguishing features of this case set 
forth in an Arby's opening brief should be carefully considered before foreclosing Arby's 
right to pursue a remedy for the loss of substantial property rights. 
4 
UDOT even attempts to raise equal protection arguments with respect to 
considering the commercial vs. non-commercial property distinction in this case. The 
case UDOT cites for this proposition, Grutter v. Bollenger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) isn't 
even a condemnation case. That case involved race-conscious admission policies of the 
University of Michigan Law School. At any rate, Arby's and the property owners in 
Harvey Real Estate are clearly not similarly situated. See Brief of Appellants at pp. 10-
11. Therefore, there is no basis for UDOT's equal protection argument. It is well settled 
each case should be decided on its own set of facts. See Tasters Ltd., Inc. v. Department 
of Employment Sec., 863 P.2d 12, 19 (UT App. 1993). See also Leininger v. Steams-
Roger Mfg. Co., 404 P.2d 33, 41 (Utah 1965) ("each case must be decided on the basis of 
its own facts and seldom are two cases identical."). Harvey Real Estate should not be 
applied blindly to the present matter. 
POINT 2. 
UDOT'S CAUSATION ARGUMENT 
IS TOO NARROW 
Pursuant to its interpretation of the Harvey Real Estate decision, upon which it 
almost exclusively relies, UDOT concludes Arby's can recover no severance damages for 
loss of reasonable access because the damage suffered by Arby's is unrelated to the 
taking. Based upon Harvey Real Estate, UDOT argues the US 89/Shepard Lane 
intersection closure was not caused by the condemnation of Arby's property. To take 
such a causation argument to its logical extreme would severely infringe upon the clear 
constitutional and statutory rights of property owners. Claims for severance damages 
5 
would be improperly restricted by semantics rather than reality, and one more step would 
be taken in the direction of rendering UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-10(2)* meaningless. 
Therefore, UDOT is either misapplying Harvey Real Estate or, alternatively, the Harvey 
Real Estate decision needs further consideration with respect to how far it goes in 
interpreting and applying the condemnation statutes to limit a property owner's ability to 
pursue claims of severance damages. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Harvey Real Estate describes a concern that if the 
property owner in that case had been allowed to recover severance damages, it would 
open up claims for property owners along a multi-mile-length of road construction 
project, seeking damages for construction being done miles away. See 57 P.3d at 1090. 
Based upon the distinct and unique facts of the present matter, Arby's could be allowed to 
pursue its severance damages claims without opening up the Pandora's box that was of 
concern to the supreme court in deciding Harvey Real Estate. The portion of UDOT's 
project that impacts Arby's property is immediately adjacent to Arby's property. Arby's 
is not seeking relief for conditions that are miles away from its property. 
In sum, UDOT's causation argument makes no sense if the condemnation statute is 
to provide any protection at all to property owners. UDOT admits Arby's property was 
The court, jury or referee must hear such legal evidence as may be offered by 
any of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess: 
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger 
parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be 
condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be 
condemned and the construction of the improvement in the manner 
proposed by plaintiff. . . . (Emphasis added). 
6 
taken "for the widening of an expressway State Route 89. . . ." Condemnation Resolution, 
R. at p. 6. The widening project involved closing the intersection at which Arby's 
commercial property is located. UDOT's project could not have been accomplished had 
Arby's property not been taken and incorporated into UDOT's project. In essence, 
Arby's was required to give up property for incorporation into a construction project that 
has destroyed the value of Arby's commercial property. This is precisely the type of case 
where the Constitution and Utah's severance damages statute should protect the property 
owner when forced to make a sacrifice for the public good. There clearly is a sufficient 
causal relationship between the taking and the severance damages Arby's has suffered. 
Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-10(2), the matter should be presented to the trier 
of fact for determination. 
POINT 3. 
REASONABLENESS OF ACCESS 
IS A QUESTION OF FACT 
Although UDOT is confident the language of Harvey Real Estate concerning 
causation ends the inquiry about severance damages, UDOT takes up nearly four pages of 
The value of Arby's commercial property had much to do with its location, 
which made it highly visible and allowed for easy access by customers. That access has 
now been severely curtailed. 
UDOT improperly relies upon the case of Intermountain Sports, Inc. v. 
Department ofTransp. 103 P.3d 716 (Ut. App. 2004). Intermountain Sports is obviously 
distinguishable from the present matter because it did not involve the taking of any 
property. It was an inverse condemnation case. The case of Utah Dep 't. of Transp. v. 
D'Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220 (Utah 1987), which is also cited by UDOT, is similarly 
distinguishable. 
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its brief inappropriately arguing the current access to Arby's property is reasonable. 
UDOT's argument is nothing more than pure speculation. No trier of fact has made such 
a determination based upon the evidence. Arby's has been prevented from putting on any 
such evidence. That is the core issue of this appeal. 
As an alternative to its claim that access to Arby's property is reasonable, UDOT 
argues other factors, such as the closure of a nearby K-Mart, are the cause of Arby's 
damages. UDOT also argues recently placed blue exit signs with Arby's logo attached 
have remedied any problem caused by Arby's loss of visibility. The court should 
disregard such speculative arguments because they have not been considered prior to this 
appeal. 
POINT 4. 
ARBY'S IS ENTITLED TO PURSUE DAMAGES 
FOR LOSS OF VIEW AND VISIBILITY 
While UDOT relies heavily on Harvey Real Estate, that case is distinguishable 
from the present matter because it did not involve the loss of an abutting property owner's 
appurtenant rights of light, air and view. In other words, Harvey Real Estate has no direct 
precedential value with respect to the present case. On the other hand, the facts in Utah 
During the motion phase at the trial court, Arby's submitted a study it 
commissioned to show the reduced access. See Traffic Study, R. at 116-118. UDOT 
never objected to Arby's submission of the report, which is now part of the record. See 
State of Utah v. Law, 75 P.3d 923, 924 (UT App. 2003) ("an appellate court's review is 
limited to the evidence contained in the record on appeal."). However, UDOT now asks 
the appellate court to disregard that report in its consideration of this appeal. UDOT's 
objection should be deemed waived inasmuch as it has waited until now to complain 
about the traffic study. See State of Utah v. Amoroso, 975 P.2d 505, 507 (UT App. 1999) 
(generally, appellate courts will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal). 
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State Road Comm'n. v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974) are much more similar to the 
facts in the present matter. The Utah Supreme Court in Miya affirmed the property 
owner's award of severance damages resulting from the construction of an elevated 
viaduct built within a roadway abutting the property owner's property. 
The Miya case clearly provides that an abutting property owner has the appurtenant 
rights of light and air. 526 P.2d at 929 ("An owner of land abutting on a street is also in 
possession of an easement of view, which constitutes a property right which may not be 
taken without just compensation."). The Miya court held "the rights of access, light and 
air are easements appurtenant to the land of an abutting owner on a street; they constitute 
property rights forming part of the owner's estate." Id. at 928 (emphasis added). In fact, 
UDOT admits the existence of these appurtenant rights. See UDOT's brief at p. 15. The 
court in Miya went on to hold these appurtenant property rights are "substantial" and 
cannot be taken without just compensation. Id. at 928 and 929. 
In the present matter, Arby's remaining property abuts UDOT's new roadway 
system, which contains the newly elevated US 89. In fact, Arby's is immediately west of 
the pinnacle of the US 89 overpass. Arby's view to the east is totally blocked. 
Additionally, the property's ability to be seen has been obstructed by UDOT's project. 
Obviously, Arby's, as an abutting property owner to the roadway, has had its appurtenant 
rights infringed upon by UDOT. 
Like the present case, the construction project in Miya involved an elevated 
roadway and a system of one-way frontage roads. Miya, 526 P.2d at 928. 
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Miya does not hold the precise component of an abutting construction project that 
interferes with view and visibility be constructed on the property taken from the 
complaining property owner. Miya only requires the property abut the roadway, which 
the Arby's property does in this case. The supreme court specifically stated in Miya: 
"one of the rights appurtenant to abutting property is that of receiving light and air from 
the highway, and an abutting owner is entitled to compensation for infringement of his 
right to light and air by a structure in the highway, even if it is a proper highway use." Id. 
at 929 (emphasis added). 
UDOT argues Harvey Real Estate modifies Miya. However, a careful review of 
both cases indicates Harvey Real Estate, which did not include facts similar to those 
presented in the present matter, only explains that if a property owner claims special and 
peculiar injury, as opposed to infringement of appurtenant property rights, the special or 
peculiar injury must be related to the taking. 57 P.3d at 1092. Because the present case 
involves UDOT's infringement of Arby's appurtenant property rights, the special and 
peculiar injury analysis need not be addressed. 
6
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-10(2) does not expressly state that the construction of 
the improvement must be located on the property that has been taken in order for a 
property owner to seek severance damages. 
7
 Harvey Real Estate points out that u[a]s a practical matter, where a taking has 
occurred, an owner would not need to rely on the 'special and peculiar injury' he has 
suffered because he could recover directly for the taking itself." Harvey Real Estate, 57 
P.2d at 1092. The present matter does involve a taking; therefore, Arby's need not rely 
upon the special and peculiar injury element as a basis for its severance damages claim. 
10 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing and the arguments set forth in Arby's opening brief, this 
court should reverse the trial court's ruling and permit Arby's to put on evidence of 
severance damages at trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 10 day of July, 2005. 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
\ONALD J. WINDER 
>HN W. HOLT 
Attorneys for 
Defendants/Appellants 
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